President Nixon |
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President Nixon
Documents show
Nixon deception on war in Cambodia
WASHINGTON (AP) ? Even after Richard Nixon's secret war in
Cambodia became known, the president persisted in deception.
"Publicly, we say one thing," he told aides. "Actually, we
do another."
Newly declassified documents from the Nixon years shed light
on the Vietnam War, the struggle with the Soviet Union for
global influence and a president who tried not to let public
and congressional opinion get in his way.
They also show an administration determined to win
re-election in 1972, with Nixon aides seeking ways to use
Jimmy Hoffa to tap into the labor movement. The former
Teamsters president had been pardoned by Nixon in 1971.
The release Wednesday of some 50,000 pages by the National
Archives means about half the national security files from
the Nixon era now are public.
On May 31, 1970, a month after Nixon went on TV to defend
the previously secret U.S. bombings and troop movements in
Cambodia, asserting that he would not let his nation become
"a pitiful, helpless giant," the president met his top
military and national security aides at the Western White
House in San Clemente, Calif.
Revelation of the operation had sparked protests and
congressional action against what many lawmakers from both
parties considered an illegal war. Nixon noted that
Americans believed the Cambodian operation was "all but
over," even as 14,000 troops were engaged across the border
in a hunt for North Vietnamese operating there.
In a memo from the meeting marked Eyes Only, Top Secret
Sensitive, Nixon told his military men to continue doing
what was necessary in Cambodia, but to say for public
consumption that the United States was merely providing
support to South Vietnamese forces when necessary to protect
U.S. troops.
"That is what we will say publicly," he asserted. "But now,
let's talk about what we will actually do."
He instructed: "I want you to put the air in there and not
spare the horses. Do not withdraw for domestic reasons but
only for military reasons."
"We have taken all the heat on this one." He went on: "Just
do it. Don't come back and ask permission each time."
The military chiefs, more than their civilian bosses,
expressed worry about how the war was going. "If the enemy
is allowed to recover this time, we are through," said Adm.
Thomas H. Moorer, the naval operations chief who two months
later would become chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Nixon told his aides to plan offensive operations in neutral
Laos, continue U.S. air operations in Cambodia and work on a
summer offensive in South Vietnam. "We cannot sit here and
let the enemy believe that Cambodia is our last gasp."
The papers also are thick with minute aspects of Vietnam
war-making and diplomacy. They show growing worries about
the ability of the South Vietnamese government years before
it fell, but also seek encouragement wherever it could be
found.
One May 1970 cable marked "For Confidential Eyes Only"
provided national security adviser Henry Kissinger with an
inventory of captured weapons, supplies and food. It noted,
for example, that the 1,652.5 tons of rice seized so far
would "feed over 6,000 enemy soldiers for a full year at the
full ration."
The papers also show concern that superpower rivalry would
take a dangerous turn if events in the Middle East got out
of hand. Israel's secretive nuclear program quietly alarmed
Washington.
One U.S. official, reporting to Secretary of State William
Rogers in 1969, said Israel's public and private assurances
that it would not introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle
East could not be believed.
The memo by undersecretary Joseph J. Sisco said U.S.
intelligence believed "Israel is rapidly developing a
capability to produce and deploy nuclear weapons," and this
could spark a Middle East nuclear arms race drawing Arab
nations under a Soviet "nuclear umbrella."
Sisco's memo foresaw a chain of troubles if Israel could not
be restrained.
"Israel's possession of nuclear weapons would do nothing to
deter Arab guerrilla warfare or reduce Arab irrationality;
on the contrary it would add a dangerous new element to
Arab-Israeli hostility with added risk of confrontation
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R," Sisco said.
To this day, Israel officially neither confirms nor denies
its nuclear status and the actual size of its stockpile
remains uncertain. But it has long been considered the only
nation in the Middle East with atomic weapons.
"For a long time, the U.S. kept secret its assessment of the
status of the Israeli nuclear program," said William Burr,
senior analyst at the National Security Archives at George
Washington University. The paper shows "Israel could develop
nuclear weapons fairly quickly, something that isn't widely
known."
On the political front, the documents show the Nixon
administration saw Hoffa as a potential help to the
re-election campaign.
A memo on March 19, 1971, from White House counsel John Dean
to Attorney General John Mitchell spelled out the political
calculation after Hoffa's wife and son requested a meeting
with Nixon to ask for leniency. At the time, White House
officials were concerned that Sen. Edward M. Kennedy,
D-Mass., could mount a fierce challenge for the presidency.
"If he is paroled, we may get some credit and he will start
off with a constructive relationship with the president. He
would be a dedicated factor to box in Kennedy, and he might
eventually be key for us to organized labor," Dean wrote.
Nixon pardoned Hoffa in December 1971 for convictions on
jury tampering and mail fraud charges, then got the
Teamsters' endorsement a year later. Critics have long
contended that administration officials cut a deal in
exchange for political favors, though that never has been
proved.
Dith
Pran / New York Times
kdburton3@verizon.net www.dithpran.org |
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