Spreading the Word of the Cambodian Genocide
CAMBODIA RESEARCH CENTRE
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copyright : 1998, raoul marc jennar
CRC A/16
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS
The establishment of the National Assembly is both, a recognition and an
acceptance of the results of the elections by the elected members who have
been sworn in. It marks the end of the election process.
The composition of a government - which, in a parliamentary democracy,
could take effect under circumstances other than after a poll - is a matter
that is no longer part of the election process. The end of this process
allows for an analysis of the results fo the elections.
For budgetary reasons, the CRC papers are sent by email only. This
presents certain constraints, particularly when texts are complemented by
tables. Tables have been simplified when possible to avoid figures from
appearing dispersed. Should this occur, we would like to apologise. We
do hope that the analysis of the figures is explicit enough to allow a good
comprehension. Tables have been avoided when possible.
Abbreviations:
FUNCINPEC: French acronym for National United Front for an
Independent, Neutral, Pacific and Co-operative Cambodia; created in 1981
by the then Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The presidency of the party was
passed onto the Prince Norodom Ranariddh in 1992.
CPP: Cambodian People's Party; stems from the People's Revolutionary
Party of Kampuchea in 1991. The latter was recreated on the 5 January
1979. The president of the CPP is Mr. Chea Sim.
SRP: Sam Rainsy Party; holds the name of its president after having been
constrained to change its original name (Khmer Nation Party) given to it
upon its creation in 1995.
A. THE RESULTS
A.1 VALID VOTES
In 1993, there were 4,011,631 valid votes. In 1998, 4,902,508 votes were
valid, showing a progression of 22.21%. Overall participation amounted
to 93.74%.
The progression in the number of valid votes is not only due to the growth
in the population, it also results from the fact that, in 1993, large
portions
of Khmer Rouge controlled territory had been declared "inaccessible
zones" by UNTAC. UNTAC had renounced its mandate in these zones,
particularly that of organising elections.
The growth in the number of valid votes is particularly significant in the
provinces of Kompong Thom (+46.40%), Preah Vihear (+70.26) and Siem
Reap (45.14%). Wide areas of the three provinces had been controlled by
the Khmer Rouge in 1993. The percentage of valid votes that result from
both, a participation rate above 90% and a greater possibility for voters
to
participate in the poll increases its representativeness.
It is also interesting to note the creation of two new constituencies in
1998; constituencies which did not exist in 1993; namely Kep and Pailin.
1993 1998
difference
in %
Banteay Meanchey 187,465 225,094 +
20.07
Battambang 266,973
300,333 + 12.49
Kampong Cham 597,766 721,224
+ 20.65
Kampong Chhnang 133,801 168,763
+ 26.13
Kampong Speu 201,355 245,335
+ 21.84
Kampong Thom 155,372 227,461
+ 46.40
Kampot 190,756
224,311 + 17.59
Kandal 377,288
509,080 + 34.93
Koh Kong 41,299
46,809 + 13.34
Kratie 86,971
107,804 + 23.95
Mondulkiri 10,392
11,872 + 14.24
Phnom Penh 440,737
475,181 + 7.81
Preah Vihear 28,361
48,288 + 70.26
Prey Veng 382,098
442,421 + 15.79
Pursat 119,301
132,812 + 11.32
Ratanakiri 30,708
35,904 + 16.92
Siem Reap 194,735
282,646 + 45.14
Sihanoukville 55,320
64,538 + 16.66
Stung Treng 27,364
31,168 + 13.90
Svay Rieng 191,078
218,251 + 14.22
Takeo 292,491
358,916 + 22.71
Kep
12,553
Pailin
11,744
Total 4,011,631
4.902,508 + 22.21
The increase in the number of votes and the reorganisation of the
constituencies have both affected the increase in the number of
parliamentary seats, from 120 to 122.
A 2. RESULTS OF PARTIES OBTAINING ELECTED OFFICIALS
CPP: 2,030,790, that is 41.42%, 64 seats (51 in 1993)
FUNCINPEC: 1,554,405, that is 31.70%, 43 seats (58 in 1993)
SRP: 699,665, that is 14.27%, 15 seats.
The 617,648 remaining votes were distributed among the 36 parties that
obtained no seats.
A 3. RESULTS OF THE 8 PARTIES STEMMING FROM THE 1993
FUNCINPEC
(total number of votes obtained and percentage of the total number of
valid votes)
FUNCINPEC: (Norodom Ranariddh): 1,554,405, that s 31.70%.
SRP (Sam Rainsy): 699,665, that is, 14.27%
REASTR NIYUM (Ung Huot): 37,308, that is 0.75%
KHMER ANGKOR PARTY (Kong Mony): 26,482, that is, 0.54%
KHMER CITIZEN PARTY (Nguon Soeur): 23,713, that is, 0.49%
KHMER UNITY PARTY (Khieu Rada): 19,232, that is, 0.39%
SANGKUM THMEY: (Loy Sim Chheang): 15,066, that is 0.30%
NATIONAL UNITY PARTY (Toan Chay): 11,889, that is, 0.24%
Total: 2,387,760, that is 48.70%
A 4. THE BLDP AND ITS SPLITTING
In 1993, two political formations were born from the KPNLF, presided by
Mr. Son Sann. The KPNLF was one of the signatory parties of the Paris
accords in 1991. The two political parties, the BLDP and the LDP
participate to the 1993 election. The LDP obtained no elected officials
whereas the BLDP obtained 10 seats. In 1998, three parties emanate from
the 1993 BLDP and present themselves at the poll. They obtain no seats.
In 1993
BLDP: 152,764
In 1998
GRAND FATHER SON SANN PARTY (Son Soubert): 45,849
BUDDHIST LIBERAL PARTY (Ieng Mouly): 32,959
LIGHT OF LIBERTY PARTY (Thach Reng): 10,027
The evolution of the 1991 KPNLF provides another example of the
tendency of Cambodian political parties to divide and disperse themselves.
Today, this political current has disappeared from the parliamentary scene.
A 5. COMPARISONS 1993 / 1998
CPP 1993: 1,533,471 (38.23%)
CPP 1998: 2,030,790 (41.42%)
FUNCINPEC 1993: 1,824,188 (45.47%)
FUNCINPEC 1998: 1,554,405 (31.70%)
FUNCINPEC + SRP (1998): 2,254,070 (45.97%)
Total number of votes obtained in 1998 by the 8 parties stemming from
the 1993 FUNCINPEC: 2,387,760 (48.70%)
The addition of the votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC and those of the
SRP in 1998 represents an increase of 23.56% from the votes obtained by
the FUNCINPEC alone in 1993. Adding up the votes obtained by the 8
parties stemming from the FUNCINPEC shows an increase of 30.91%.
For reference, the increase in the average total number of valid votes is
of
22.21% (see above).
A 6. RESULTS OF THE CPP BY CONSTITUENCY
1993 1998
seats en
1993/1998
Banteay Meanchey 53,137 84,225
2/3
Battambang 82,735
107,825 3/3
Kampong Cham 183,268
246,900 6/7
Kampong Chhnang 70,532
78,692 2/3
Kanpong Speu 105,085
124,458 3/4
Kampong Thom 69,848
93,467
3/4
Kampot 76,494
104,596 3/4
Kandal 94,755
184,742 3/4
Koh Kong 19,992
20,379
1/1
Kratie 20,998
35,297
1/1
Mondulkiri 6,987
8,296
1/1
Phnom Penh 136,442
140,409 4/4
Preah Vihear 19,095
34,203
1/1
Prey Veng 186,820
220,915 6/7
Pursat 55,148
58,918
2/2
Ratanakiri 25,522
27,162 1/1
Siem Reap 65,579
137,661 2/3
Sihanoukville 18,492
24,067 0/1
Stung Treng 16,526
17,761
1/1
Svay Rieng 108,205
117,687 3/4
Takeo 117,811
153,808 3/4
Kep
6,296 -/1
Pailin
3,326 -/0
Total 1,533,471
2,030,790 51/64
A 7. RESULTS OF THE FUNCINPEC BY CONSTITUENCY
1993 1998
seats en
1993/1998
Banteay Meanchey 88,013 56,439
3/2
Battambang 128,694 82,653
4/3
Kompong Cham 322,358 277,362
10/8
Kompong Chhnang 43,511 47,046
2/1
Kompong Speu 57,767 62,882
2/2
Kompong Thom 55,434 69,711
2/2
Kampot 80,313
63,488 3/2
Kandal 225,083
198,073 7/5
Koh Kong 14,699
11,262 0/0
Kratie 54,916
45,497 2/2
Mondulkiri 1,765
2,068
0/0
Phnom Penh 239,815 159,008
7/4
Preah Vihear 5,478 6,592
0/0
Prey Veng 148,499 143,068
4/4
Pursat 42,614
42,760 2/2
Ratanakiri 2,225
3,268
0/0
Siem Reap 96,548
69,228 3/2
Sihanoukville 26,010 19,945
1/0
Stung Treng 7,425
5,393 0/0
Svay Rieng 57,139 52,778
2/1
Takeo 125,802
129,388 4/3
Kep
4,316 -/0
Pailin
2,180 -/0
Total : 1,824,188 1,554,405
58/43
A 8. RESULTS OF THE SRP BY CONSTITUENCY
1998 seats
Banteay Meanchey 47,584 1
Battambang 64,199
2
Kompong Cham 96,720
3
Kompong Chhnang 11,143 0
Kompong Speu 19,881
0
Kompong Thom 22,704
0
Kampot 23,516
0
Kandal 80,985
2
Koh Kong 9,111
0
Kratie 14,969
0
Mondulkiri 1,061
0
Phnom Penh 132,127
4
Preah Vihear 4,105
0
Prey Veng 30,161
0
Pursat 11,259
0
Ratanakiri 3,683
0
Siem Reap 43,523
1
Sihanoukville 13,535
0
Stung Treng 6,469
0
Svay Rieng 18,050
0
Takeo 38,152
1
Kep
995 0
Pailin 5,733
1
Total 699,665
15
A 9. COMPARISON OF CPP / FUNCINPEC + SRP VOTES (1998)
PPC FUNCINPEC + SRP
Banteay Meanchey 84,225 104,023
Battambang 107,825
146,852
Kampong Cham 246,900
374,082
Kampong Chhnang 78,692
58,189
Kampong Speu 124,458
82,763
Kampong Thom 93,467
92,415
Kampot
104,596 87,004
Kandal
184,742 279,058
Koh Kong
20,379 20,373
Kratie
35,297 60,466
Mondulkiri
8,296 3,129
Phnom Penh 140,109
291,135
Preah Vihear 34,203
10,697
Prey Veng 220,915
173,229
Pursat
58,918 54,019
Ratanakiri 27,162
6,951
Siem Reap 137,661
112,751
Sihanoukville 24,067
33,480
Stung Treng 17,761
11,862
Svay Rieng 117,687
70,828
Takeo
153,808 167,540
Kep
6,296 5,301
Pailin
3,326 7,913
Total
2,030,790 2,254,070
B. ANALYSIS
The number of seats obtained by the CPP increased from 51 in 1993 to 64
in 1998, representing a gain of 13 seats. The number of seats obtained by
the FUNCINPEC decreased from 58 to 43, showing a loss of 15 seats.
The SRP obtained 15 seats.
Whilst amplified by the chosen method of implementation of the election
system, the shift in the distribution of seats reflects a movement in the
distribution of votes, that is, a shift in the vote of each individual
voter.
Indeed, the CPP obtained 1,533,471 votes in 1993 and 2,030,790 in 1998.
The FUNCINPEC goes from 1,800,188 to 1,544,405 votes and the
dissident FUNCINPEC party, the SRP, wins 699,655 votes.
In order to understand the will expressed by the electorate in the 26 July
and, by the same token, verify the accusations of "massive fraud"
expressed by the opposition, one must examine the figures and observe:
a) the degree of fluidity of the electorate,
b) its degree of stability, and
c) in which ways do the above two phenomena give way to manipulations
and frauds, taking into account the increase of the electorate (an increase
of 22.21% in valid votes).
The first and most striking observation that stems from the poll is the
transfer of votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC in 1993 to the SRP in 1998
as well as a split in royalist votes of 1993. Indeed, with 699,665 votes,
the
SRP is the primary beneficiary of the erosion of the FUNCINPEC. The
other formations stemming from the royalist party of 1993 obtained a total
of 133,690 votes.
There was an important transfer of members of the FUNCINPEC to the
KNP (which became the SRP) of Mr. Sam Rainsy starting in 1995. It is
confirmed by the behaviour of the electorate in 1998. Furthermore, it is
evident that a section of the new electorate brought its vote to the SRP
and
only a very small proportion to the FUNCINPEC.
This transfer is confirmed by the shift in the allocation of seats. The
FUNCINPEC lost 15 seats, whilst the SRP gained 15. Seven of the 11
constituencies where the FUNCINPEC lost seats are those where the SRP
gained them. In three of the other 4 constituencies (Kampong Chhnang,
Kampot and Svay Rieng) where the FUNCINPEC lost seats, the 7 other
parties emerging from the 1993 FUNCINPEC total, each time, more than
5,000 votes.
The second observation that can be made from the results is that the CPP
gained votes in all constituencies, although in a very unequal way. In 9
constituencies, the increase in the number of votes obtained by the CPP is
inferior to the increase in the total number of valid votes for those
constituencies (Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, Koh Kong, Phnom
Penh, Pursat, Ratanakiri, Stung Treng, Svay Rieng). This reflects a
stagnation, and even a decrease, in the number of votes obtained by the
CPP. Nevertheless, compared to the 1993 results, the CPP did not loose
any votes in any of the constituencies, even in Phnom Penh where it
gained a meagre 2% of votes. Banteay Meanchey, Kandal, Kratie, Preah
Vihear and Siem Reap are the 5 provinces where the CPP showed the
strongest gain. They are also the provinces where the number of votes
obtained by the CPP exceeded its national average growth.
Third observation; there is a permanent royalist majority in the
electorate,
although it is very much split. If the votes obtained in 1998 by the 8
parties emerging from the 1993 FUNCINPEC are added together, the
result is a total that exceeds the 1993 FUNCINPEC result. In 1993, the
FUNCINPEC obtained 45.47% of the votes. In 1998, the total percentage
of votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC and the SRP together equals
45.97%. Adding up the percentages of the 6 parties to that of the
FUNCINPEC and the SRP, we obtain a total of 48.70%. There is an
important element of stability in the royalist electorate that is not
immediately reflected by the dispersion of its political expression.
Fourth observation; the CPP and the SRP are the two parties that benefited
the most from the emergence of new voters. It is evident for the SRP in
Phnom Penh and in Pailin and for the CPP in Preah Vihear and Siem
Reap.
Fifth observation; the votes of Phnom Penh did not reflect the national
tendencies. In the capital, there was a very equal share of votes between
the 3 parties. It is reflected in the equal number of seats obtained by
each
of them.
Sixth observation; the above observations leave little space for possible
"massive fraud". In terms of the votes, the major characteristics of the
1998 poll were not very different from those of the 1993 poll, namely, a
major royalist current and a very powerful CPP. What brought about a
significant change in the political scene of the country is the
configuration
of the parties. The CPP remained united, its competitors split.
Upon adopting a Constitution, Cambodia opted for a representative
democracy rather than a direct democracy. It is therefore not possible to
give a legal value to the votes obtained by the different parties, even
when
these - as is currently the case- express the same political behaviour.
Both, the FUNCINPEC and the SRP had knowledge of the regulations
prior to the poll. They knew that, upon addressing the electorate as two
separate parties, they considerably decreased their chances of winning.
Had they had the political will to unite their strengths, they would have
had the possibility to merge or to present a list of cartel, that is, a
single
list of candidates from both parties. They chose a different strategy.
They
must now take responsibility for the consequences of their choices instead
of blaming a "massive fraud" (for which they never presented any proofs)
when the figures show that fraud could not have been more than marginal.
C. THE VALIDITY AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RESULTS
"Cheap elections"; "Elections of second class"; "Electoral
farce". Readers
will have read many things about the 1998 elections in the many
newspapers that covered the event. With few exceptions, these
newspapers included everything except an honest account of the facts.
The bitterness of the many Cambodians who, for months, gave their very
best to the election process, with the intense desire to show the world
that
Cambodia is capable of organising credible elections, is as great as it is
comprehensible.
It meant, however, ignoring both, the partisan spirit which fuelled the
actions of many demagogues prepared to do everything and anything and
the obliging nature of journalists who took little care to diversify their
sources.
A good example is reflected in an article of the French language
newspaper "Le Soir" distributed world-wide through Internet by the
friends of Mr. Sam Rainsy. The article in question was written by a
special envoy who arrived in Phnom Penh one month after the poll. It
quotes an anonymous "independent observer" whose precision and
impartiality are difficult to appreciate. The observer reproduces, word
for
word, the discourse of the opposition relating to the way in which the
election operations were observed.
The professionalism of the journalist did not incite her to confront the
information she had received from her ghost speaker with information she
could have obtained from representatives of the observation unit of the
European Union, had she taken the time to visit them. She thus quotes this
unknown observer as follows "on the day of the vote, the observers stayed
in the large cities and only vaguely observed what was happening in the
voting stations; none went to the remote provinces". This statement
constitutes a remarkable model of disinformation. This issue will be
analysed further below.
Why are the Cambodian opposition and the media which support it so
intent upon destroying the observation process?
In a context of absolute suspicion that characterises the Cambodian
political scene - suspicion that is largely justified from all sides in
view of
what has been witnessed - only an external observation could testify to the
real value of the poll. Nevertheless, the most neutral and experimented of
observers, who had had experience in detecting fraud or intimidation and
who had observed a number of polls in various countries, were the first to
identify the cheaters, from the very beginning of the registration process.
They observed and reported that SRP commandos had disturbed the
formalities during the registration of voters to discredit the election
process from the very beginning of its first phase. They noted that the
CPP Chiefs of village who, under election law have no responsibilities,
were abusing of their authority. In both cases, they reacted according to
international regulations relating to the observation process. They were
able to appreciate the consideration given to their observation by one and
all. They were able to judge the different reactions. For a SRP whose aim
is the destruction of the current political system (which stems from the
1993 Constitution) the observers became the enemy. They represented the
persons who could validate the poll. They were the persons who needed
to be discredited at all costs.
The international observers - more than 500 from some 40 countries or
groups of countries - were neither the tourists nor the partisans described
by the journalists. It is these journalists who should have been
questioned
about their neutrality. Within teams of observers as large as these there
are, of course, always a few persons who are ill-adapted to undertake such
missions. There is little doubt that certain observers undertook their
missions with a very narrow frame of mind. The presence of observers
from the International Republican Institute who contributed to the funding
of advisors to Mr. Sam Rainsy did cause a certain amount of unrest amidst
the representatives of international NGOs. The latter were keen to
counterbalance this stance by organising themselves under the umbrella of
a former Ambassador of Australia to Cambodia. These were very isolated
cases. Moreover, their missions have not been proven to have been
dishonest. Nevertheless, these isolated cases should not blemish the
professionalism, the precision, the moral and intellectual honesty of the
large majority of the observers who did come to Cambodia to contribute to
the accomplishment of democracy.
It seems important to recall that the process of observation is different
from a role of supervision or monitoring. Observation is a process
whereby a series of surveys and verifications using a set of defined
criteria
are undertaken in at least 10% of randomly selected voting and counting
stations. The process of observation was not improvised for Cambodia
alone. It is a process which abides by precise international norms and
which has been applied to the realities of Cambodia. It follows a very
precise methodology.
Foreign observers who came to Cambodia as either long-term observers
(starting from the beginning of the registration of voters up until the
swearing in of the elected officials) or short-term observers (who came for
the last days of the election campaign, the days of the poll and of the
counting) were, for a large majority, prepared for this mission in theory
and in practice. The selection of these observers by the UN as well as by
the European Union prioritised the candidates who had experience in
countries with similar situations as Cambodia and, of course, who had
taken part in the 1993 election process.
The insulting statements made against the observers and their spokesman,
Mr. Sven G. Linder, discredit only its authors and journalists. These are
the very same who, like the author of the article in "Le Soir" mentioned
above, gave credit to the observer by quoting so-called experts who
remained, of course, anonymous. Once again, Mr. Sam Rainsy language
was the most outrageous inciting to hate and xenophobia. But, as usual,
"what is extreme is trivial" and Mr. Sam Rainsy statements do not
depreciate the quality of the observation process and the relevance of the
observers final conclusion.
The resources available for the observation process were exceptionally
significant. They included a contingency of foreign observers. More
essential, however, was the impressive framing of the polling and counting
stations by more than 15,000 Cambodian observers who were grouped
into three co-ordinating NGOs: COMFREL, COFFEL and NICFEC.
These organisations proved, with a lot of courage and on many occasions,
their independence from the authorities. Their observers received special
training which was evaluated by foreign observers.
Contrary to the statement made by the anonymous observer quoted above
in the newspaper "Le Soir", the international observers were deployed
throughout the country, with priority on constituencies which were the
most heavily populated and whose vote would be decisive in the allocation
of seats between the main parties. They proceeded to work, not only in
the main towns of these constituencies, but also in less significant rural
areas. The work of the observers was by no means "a vague glance".
It
was a systematic verification of a list of specifications which enabled to
determine the level of quality of the poll. With respect to the number of
polling and counting stations visited, the international observers exceeded
international standards. As for their Cambodian counterparts, they were
present in all polling and counting stations.
In the issue CRC 9, we quoted various views formulated by different
groups of observers with regards to the election process. None declared
that the election operations should be invalidated. Taking into account
certain nuances and variable intensities of the existence of fraud, the
appraisals have, by and large, confirmed that the poll enabled Cambodians
to freely express their choice and that the results express that choice.
As
was declared by the international observers' co-ordination, "what could be
observed by us on Polling and Counting Day was a process which was
free and fair to an extent that enables it to reflect, in a credible way,
the
will of the Cambodian people".
This appraisal was once again reiterated recently by Ambassador Sven G.
Linder, on the 2 October, date of his departure, when he declared that:
"The European Union Observation Unit has found no indication of flaws
and frauds of a magnitude that could have distorted the will of the
Cambodian voters as that will was expressed on the 26th of July."
The government of the United States equally confirmed, on two separate
occasions, the appraisal of the American observers, as was published in
the CRC 9 paper. Indeed, on 28 September, Mr. Ralph A. Boyce, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs declared to the
House of Representatives: ". . . We see this as a credible expression of
the
free will of Cambodians. (. . .) Some of the recounts demanded by the
opposition were carried out, and many of the allegations turned out to be
frivolous. (. . .) A final point here on the credibility of the election
outcome: to the best of our knowledge, even completion of the recounts
would not have significantly altered the overall outcome or deprived the
CPP of plurality. The independent and reputable Cambodian NGO,
COMFREL, which fielded over 15,000 poll watchers, conducted its own
parallel count on election day; it is worth noting that, by COMFREL's
count, the CPP also won a clear plurality of the vote."
On the 2 October, Mr. Stanley O. Roth, Assistant to Ms. M. Albright for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs declared to the US Senate that: "The
election results indicate that Cambodians indeed voted freely: some six
out of ten voters chose a party other than the ruling Cambodian People's
Party (CPP). It may be useful to note, Mr. Chairman, that had the
opposition unified prior to the elections, they, and not Hun Sen's CPP,
would have primary responsibility for forming a new government. (. . .) we
must recognize that in the judgement of most international observers,
proper completion of the recounts would not have significantly altered the
outcome or deprived the CPP of its plurality."
We are far from thinking that what is right for the US is right for the
rest
of the world. Nevertheless, such appraisals are not without significance
when they are statements made by a government hostile to Mr. Hun Sen
and to the CPP and reticent to accept the option of elections as a way of
solving the crisis of July 1997.
D. ALLOCATION OF SEATS
Mr. Pieter Schier, representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in
Cambodia, expressed himself like the expert and the spokesman of the
opposition concerning technical issues related to the election process.
His
NGO has, for the past several years, seriously contributed to the
information and examination by the Cambodian authorities on these
issues. Hence, it is necessary to examine the very smart arguments
developed by Mr. Schier with regards to the refusal of the opposition to
accept the formula retained by the National Election Committee (NEC) on
the 29 May. This formula puts into effect the method by which the
principle of the highest average is used. The election law provides that
the
allocation of the seats is organised in the framework of a system of
proportional representation. Mr. Schier developed his ideas in number 18
(Vol. 7) of an anti-CPP newspaper (Phnom Penh Post, 21 August, pages 6-
7).
D 1. THE FORMULA
Within the framework of an election system based on proportional
representation, there are several formulae that put into effect the
principle
of the highest average. We know well the Jefferson and the D'Hondt
formulae from which the NEC inspired itself. Equally, there are other
formulae named after their authors: Balinski, Farell, O'Neal, Webster,
Young.
These formulae are characterised by a variation with respect to the
principle of proportionality. Certain formulae apply a strict
proportionality, while others balance it so as to avoid the scattering of
parliamentary representation already favoured by the system of
proportionality itself.
As has been indicated in the CRC 12 paper, various formulae, including
that of D'Hondt, have been developed to avoid a democratic political
system from being paralysed by the multiplicity of parties.
It is true, as has been indicated by Mr. Schier, that a strict
interpretation of
the principle of proportionality means "the number of seats allocated to a
party is proportional to the number of votes obtained by the party."
Nevertheless, it is precisely in order to counter the consequences of such
a
strict interpretation of the principle that other formulae have been
developed.
One must be of good faith. The opponents of democracy - particularly in
Asia where democracy and development have been opposed - have always
declared it to be the least efficient in the management of a country. It
is
only true when confronted with situations like, for example, that of the
IVth French Republic or that in Belgium or Italy prior to the recent
constitutional changes. The multiplicity of parties paves the way of weak
coalitions that are less apt to make choices or take decisions.
Governmental crises follow each other and instability reigns.
Those who developed different formulae in the application of the strict
proportionality have attempted to reconcile the most honest representation
of the will of the people with a minimum of efficiency required by a
political system to respond to the management needs of a country.
The formula opted for by the NEC on the 29 May is the result of a choice
which the NEC was in its own right to make in view of the legal right to
interpretation of the election law conferred by Article 16 of this law.
One
can disagree with this choice. The implications of this choice are
fundamental, as was demonstrated by Mr. Schier. Five seats depend upon
the adopted formula. Considering the decision of the 29 May, those seats
are attributed to the CPP, which thus obtains the absolute majority. The
implementation of other formulae would have provoked a different
distribution of seats which would have benefited the opposition and
reduced the number of CPP seats to 59, thus giving it only a relative
majority. However, nobody can accuse the NEC of choosing a formula
with the intention of favouring the CPP since nobody could have foreseen
which party would be the beneficiary of its application. Certain
declarations of opposition representatives show that they themselves
hoped to benefit from this formula (see below).
D 2. LEGALITY OF THE FORMULA
According to Mr. Schier, the formula of the 29 May could "perhaps be
illegal" since:
a) the NEC did not specifically inform the political parties and the NGOs
concerned by the election process of the change which occurred on the 29
May in relation to the working document under discussion since the
beginning of the month of May. The NEC would have then been guilty of
a lack of transparency. To this, it is easy to respond that:
- There has been no changes per se since the documents dealing with this
issue at the beginning of May had no official value and were only working
documents which had been released to certain individuals by pure
indiscretion;
- There was no need to give particular warning on the issue which,
although fundamental, was a part of many other issues of equal value in a
document of 200 pages important as a whole since it formulated the rules
and regulations;
- The NEC cannot be accused of any other tentative of dissimulation or
lack of transparency. After having invited the political parties to the
release of the document of 200 pages comprising the entire rules and
regulations, the NEC invited them to attend explanation sessions at the
beginning of June. Few participated. None raised the issue of the
formula. On the other hand, a special paper completely describing the
formula was included in the press file released to journalists a few days
after the opening of the NEC media centre at the beginning of July;
- In responding to a question of the newspaper "The Cambodia Daily" (24
June), Mr. Sam Rainsy declared that the issue of the formula was "not
important". His declaration proves, at least, that he was informed a month
after the decision of the NEC and a month before the election. One would
think that the president of a party such as him would express an opinion
only in full knowledge of the facts.
b) Most of the political parties would have had knowledge of the formula
applied by the NEC only after the elections and, according to Mr. Schier,
one could not blame them of having been negligent since the principle
political opposition parties dedicated all of their energy to rebuilding
structures destroyed during the 1997 "coup".
This argument is not very strong.
- First of all, on the legal front, as everybody knows, "nobody can use his
own ignorance as a pretext."
- Secondly, it is pertinent to note that, between the 29 May and the 26
July, there are 59 days, a time frame largely sufficient for opposition
parties, who aspire to exercise governmental responsibilities, to study an
issue as important as the formula.
- Thirdly, as has been shown in the CRC 10 paper, the main opposition
parties resumed their activities during the first quarter of the year and a
real pre-election campaign took place in April / May, prior to the actual
official election campaign. Furthermore, the collapse of the FUNCINPEC
network did not originate from the 1997 crisis. It originated in the
method
used by the president of this party to manage the structures after 1993.
We have for proof the fact that Prince Norodom Sirivudh, after having left
the government and whilst still Secretary General of his party, had, as his
main political objective, the reanimation of these structures. Several
declarations made during this period testify to this end.
c) There are no references to a change in the formula concerning the
allocation of seats in the documents of the NEC dated 29 May nor have
any minutes been written of a debate on this issue between the members of
the NEC. To counter this criticism which has been largely supported by
the anglo-saxon press and by the opposition (criticism which was branded
"the issue of the minutes of the NEC"), one could say that the NEC did not
apply a constant and unique procedure of decision-making and that is
merely respected the legal prescription (Art. 17) whereby any decision
taken requires the agreement of the absolute majority of the members (that
is 6/11). Due to the excessive number of varied and complex duties which
it had to carry out in a very short space of time, the NEC distributed
responsibilities between its members and delegated a great number of
decisions. The president used his authority as a last resort, once options
had been chosen. By doing so, the NEC did not, in any way, violate the
law. No dispute from at least 6 of its members arose after the 29 May
questioning the method of implementation of the law relating to the
allocation of seats. Reservations from H.E. Mr. Kassie Neou, Vice-
president of the NEC, have often been cited. His moral integrity, his
intellectual honesty and his neutrality are well known. In an opinion
article
published by "The Cambodia Daily" on the 27 August, he wrote "The
proportional representation system decided on before the election,
consistent with the election law, favours the single party with the highest
number of votes in a given province." Such a statement should suffice in
closing the debate regarding the decision taken by the NEC.
d) Lastly, a rather unconvincing argument from Mr. Schier: the texts
dating from the beginning of May did not include the title "project". One
could maybe condemn the methodology used to produce documents where
the title of "project" did not appear on documents which were for internal
use and in no was destined to be distributed. A draft remains a draft as
long as it has not been revised into the format of an official document.
This was done on the 29 May. None of the texts that were released to the
public before the 29 May were presented as official documents of the
NEC. Those who had, by certain indiscretions, access to internal
documents were no doubt proud to present them as official documents.
Nevertheless, not a single opposition party took the time to verify with
the
NEC officials before the 29 May whether the documents that had been
released through leaks were "projects" or official documents. When one
pretends to govern a country, one does not consider any old piece of paper
as being an authentic document.
Mr. Schier does concede that article 16 of the election law grants the NEC
the responsibility of deciding upon matters relating to the formula to be
used for the allocation of seats. However, he fails to indicate the extent
of
delegation granted by the law to the NEC. The first paragraph of Article
16 grants the NEC general competence, indicating that it "has all of the
necessary competencies required to accomplish its mission." This
delegation of competencies is further enforced by paragraph 4 which
concerns a particular one, namely, the competence "to develop
regulations, procedures and directives necessary to ensure the
development of the elections within the context of the laws in force." No
jurist, in view of the scope of delegation of competencies granted by the
legislator would dare to support the statements saying that the NEC acted
beyond its mandate.
The formula was presented as an official NEC document dated 29 May,
that is, more than 50 days before the poll. It was thus adopted in tempore
non suspecto. It was so within the context of Article 16 of the election
law
granting the NEC extensive power relating to the implementation of legal
provisions. The formula of the 29 May is, without any doubts, perfectly
legal.
Three lessons can be learned from the issue of the formula:
- The political culture in Cambodia is still not very thorough when it
comes to the importance of norms, of their rigorous formulation and of
their strict application. The view of Cambodians with regards to the
norms is still an issue for those whose ambition it is to implement the
rule
of law.
- The legislator has a specific duty that he must fulfil in order to avoid
important problems of interpretation. This is particularly important in a
country which does not have a democratic tradition and which is therefore
prone to deadlocks. A legislator cannot hide his doubts through vague
formulae. Should the system of proportional representation be kept, the
election law must then be amended and the formula chosen by the
legislator for the implementation of the principle of the highest average
must be legalised.
- Political parties that are granted a significant place within the
political
system have certain responsibilities. They must take their
responsibilities
and not neglect them. The man who is, since the 26 July, the most
vehement opponent of the system of allocation of seats adopted on 29
May, declared on the 24 June in "The Cambodia Daily" that this issue was
not important. Irresponsibility is incompatible with the idea of
democracy.
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Article 82 of the Constitution describes the procedures of the
establishment the National Assembly. It includes three elements: the
verification of powers, the swearing in and the designation of what is
commonly described in parliamentary law as the Permanent committee
(President, vice-presidents, committees presidents).
With the establishment of this Permanent Committee, the election process
ends and the legislature starts. In respect to the most classical types of
parliamentary law, while the verification of powers and the swearing in
represent the final stages of the election process, the election of the
officials result from political choices which are the bases of a
legislature
already underway.
During the meeting of the 24 September in Siem Reap, only one of the
two procedures which enable the confirmation of the validity of the
Assembly was carried out. We have noted that the elected were sworn in
without having first, as should have been the case, passed through a
verification of their full powers. However, it must be acknowledged that
the competencies conferred to the Constitutional Council with regards to
election issues transform the issue of verification of MP powers into a
simple administrative formality.
The decisive element is that, by being sworn in, each of the Members of
Parliament accepts the mandate that he/she has pledged to put into effect
according to its stipulations. By being collectively sworn in, the elected
officials have accepted the distribution of mandates resulting from the
poll.
We can therefore conclude that, following the 24 September session, the
National Assembly was established, ending the election process.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The Cambodian electorate displays a great stability. There is a vast
royalist majority and a strong CPP, as was the case in 1993. What has
changed is the political expression of the royalist tendency. In 1993, it
was represented by only one party. In 1998, eight parties were eager to
win the votes of a single electorate.
The votes of the opposition were not "stolen", as has been claimed by the
FUNCINPEC and SRP leaders so light-heartedly and with a great deal of
bad faith. The votes were scattered.
This is the direct consequence of disputes between personalities,
conflicting ambitions and internal divisions resulting in the splitting of
the
two large structures opposing the CPP in 1993 into 11 parties in 1998.
The old Cambodian habit of blaming others for the consequences of one's
own mistakes!
A rigorous examination of the results shows that eventual fraud and
manipulations could only have been marginal.
In 1998, the total number of votes scattered amongst the 8 parties
emerging from the 1993 FUNCINPEC is greater that the total number of
votes obtained by the FUNCINPEC alone in 1993.
If those who had answered to the appeal of the founder of the
FUNCINPEC in 1981 had remained united, they would have had, in 1998,
a devastating parliamentary majority. The splitting in 1994 inspired others
such that we find eight competing parties in 1998. The royalists are the
first to be responsible for their recent weakness.
Due to the fact that the opposition does not accept a defeat for which it
is
responsible, it now puts forth accusations of "massive fraud" which do not
stand any serious examination. No one will be surprised to hear the
outrageous statements of a Sam Rainsy who has definitely disqualified
himself as a reasonable democrat. Nevertheless, it is a surprise to find
that
the FUNCINPEC officials still believe that they have the ability to
convince people using such poor arguments.
In 1993, the CPP did not obtain the largest number of votes and contested
the validity of the elections. In 1998, the FUNCINPEC and the SRP
reproduce the same scenario. It would be useless to speak of democracy
in Cambodia as long as the political class of this country is unable to
even
accept the most elementary of laws. A major question arises: does the
Cambodian political class share the civic spirit that so inspired the
Cambodian citizens in both 1993 and 1998?
Raoul Marc Jennar
12 October 1998
The Cambodia Research Centre has the pleasure to inform his
readers that one of the CRC scholars, Mr. Raoul Marc Jennar,
presented last September at the Institut National des
Langues et Civilisations Orientales, in Paris
his thesis for a Ph.D in Political Science.
The subject of the thesis was "The Cambodian border."
Mr. Jennar received the doctorate with first class honours
("magna cum laude") and the congratulations of the jury.
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